CALLING ALL DOCTORS by Varner, D.B.
PART  II
REPORT  OF  SUBCOMMITTEE  ON  INFLATION
In  considering the problem of public policy education this committee
first considered  the people with whom  the work was  to be  done.  It  was
decided  that the most  important group would be  farm people  or farm  lead-
ers  - who  came  for a special meeting  on policy;  another  important group
was farm and nonfarm groups who request a speech on a  policy problem as
part of an annual  meeting, dinner meeting, or other  activity.
The committee  attempted to  illustrate  both subject matter  and tech-
niques for these two types  of meetings.  These techniques may  be equal-
ly well applied with other groups.  To aid the extension specialist or
county agent to do  this job some  background material and suggested
readings were also prepared  by members of  the subcommittee.
J.  Carroll Bottum, Purdue University, Chairman
G. Alvin Carpenter, Utah State College
Dale E.  Hathaway, Extension Service, USDA
D.  B.  Varner, Michigan State  College
AGENDA
TIME  ALLOTTED
30 minutes  Calling All Doctors - D. B.  Varner
30  minutes  Discussion
15  minutes  Background  material  for  extension  specialists  and
county  agents  - Dale  E.  Hathaway
90  minutes  Inflation  Control  and  Greater  Price  Stability  -
J.  Carroll  Bottum
45  minutes  Break  up  into  small  discussion  groups  of  7  to  12
people  to  consider  subject  matter  and  methods
45  minutes  General  discussion
CALLING  ALL  DOCTORS
(A 30  Minute  Talk  Suitable  for Presentation  to Such Groups as  Service
Clubs, Farm Banquets, and Annual Meetings  of Farm Organizations)
Presented by D. B.  Varner
A few weeks ago, my young son checked  in  at the breakfast  table with
a  rather high temperature  and an  assortment of aches  and pains.  My wife
and I --  thinking, of  course,  that  these were  part of the all-inclusive
symptoms  of  polio,  immediately  rushed him to our pediatrician.  After
the  usual hour and  15  minute wait  in  the doctor's office,  he  proceeded
to conduct his examination.  I  was  intensely  interested in  the  proce-
dure he  followed.  The  first move made by  the  doctor was to check for
symptoms.  He  took our son's temperature  and  found it  to be  103  degrees.
He then inquired about any other pains or peculiar behavior.  Following
27the  routine  ear,  eye,  nose,  and  throat  inspection,  the  doctor  announced
to us  in  a  very  reassuring  voice  that this  was  only  a  recurrence  of  an
old  trouble  with  which  our  son  had  been  bothered  --  simply  a  case  of  in-
flamed  tonsils.  He  then  proceeded  to  explain  to  us  in  a  very  fatherly
professional  manner  (at  the  rate  of  about  $48  per  hour)  the  causes  for
this  trouble.  He  went  further.  He  said  that  it  appeared  to  him  that
unless  corrective  action  were  taken  in  the  near  future  there  was  a  dan-
ger  of  lasting  damage.  It  was  pointed  out  to  us  that  we  were  faced  with
several  alternatives  in  choosing  the  course  of action that we  should
follow.
On  the  one  hand  we  could  simply  ignore  the  trouble  and  hope  that
nature  would  correct  the  condition.  As  a  second alternative,  we  could
give  our son  an aspirin tablet each three or four hours which would tend
to reduce the  temperature, eliminate  the headache, and in  all probabil-
ity, within a  matter  of a  few days,  remove  the symptoms.  He pointed  out,
however,  that we  were going to have to face  up  to the third alternative
- that of surgery - sooner or  later.  This alternative, he  explained
carefully, was  the only one  that would give  lasting relief.
As I  observed the  performance of  this doctor of medicine, I  became  all
the more aware of the similarity which exists between a doctor and  the
treatment of  an individual  patient and an economist  in  his  treatment  of
a  collective  patient.  This  analogy is  not,  of course, a perfect one.
As  a  matter  of  fact,  it  breaks  down  on  at  least  two distinct  counts.  In
the first place doctors are  rewarded for  their services  in  large  quanti-
ties  of legal  tender, while economists  as  a  rule  receive a subsistence
wage  plus  varying  amounts  of  prestige.  The  other  sharp  difference  is
that  when  a  doctor  of  medicine  makes  a faulty diagnosis  and a  wrong
prescription the patient sometimes dies.  The evidence is  destroyed.  No
such luck  for the economist.  If  he prescribes in  error,  and  finds his
counsel accepted, his mistake lives on  to haunt him.
Nevertheless, the similarity is  real.  Today economists have been
called in  to diagnose a patient and  to  prescribe the proper treatment.
Our  patient  in  this  case  is  a very large  and  important  body  --  it  is  the
economy  of the United States of America.  The patient at  the  present
time  is  experiencing  considerable  pain,  quite  a  few headaches, and a
recurring  fever.  There  is  little  doubt  that  it  is  in  need  of  some  sort
of  economic  attention.  Let  us  all,  for  the  moment,  don  the  white  robes
of  the  doctor  and  see  what  can  be  done  for  our  patient  --  certainly  none
of  us  are  willing  to  permit  this  condition  to  become  so  aggravated  that
a  fatal  illness  develops.
You  will  recall  that  the  doctor  of  medicine  followed  five  rather
distinct  steps  in  handling  his  patient.  First,  he  checked symptoms and
then  made  the  diagnosis.  Having  diagnosed  the  illness,  he  outlined  the
causes  for  the  trouble  and  stressed  the  dangers  inherent  in  permitting
the disease  to persist.  Finally, he prescribed  the alternative  courses
of  action that were available to  us.  Let  us follow this  same procedure
with our  patient.
I. THE SYMPTOMS
The most obvious  symptom  which  confronts  us  as  we  examine  our
patient is  the very sharp  increase in  prices since  June  1950.  We  dis-
cover that  the  index of wholesale  prices  has risen 17  percent in  one
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period.  These  are definite symptoms  that there  is  a lack of adjustment
somewhere in  the system.  We  look again for symptoms and find that  cer-
tain types  of  goods  are becoming scarce  - production does not respond
normally to the  rise in  prices.  We discover  that  as  a  result  of  this,
the  government  is  stepping  in  and  making  allocations  of  some  of  these
scarce  materials.  There is  some talk  of  rationing of certain commodi-
ties  today, although this  has not yet come into  being on  the consumer
level.
A third very noticeable symptom in  this  patient  is  a  general nervous
condition.  This is,  of course, no surprise to  us since  such a  condi-
tion normally accompanies  the first  two symptoms.  This nervousness  is
evident  at  many  points.  Businessmen  are quite  shaky about the behavior
of consumers,  labor,  and  the government.  Labor has  great fear that
the cost-of-living  index will not move  up rapidly enough and  therefore
it  will become necessary to  find a  new basis  for  increased wage demands.
The  government  itself has  difficulty in  controlling the actions of all
its organs.  The administrative  branch makes vigorous  appeals to Con-
gress  for greater  power to control  the price  level but finds Congress
actually weakening existing control measures.
I I.  THE  DIAGNOSIS
Having reviewed these  obvious symptoms of our patient, we  are ready
for  the  second step in  our procedure  - that  of making a diagnosis.
Certainly  in  this  case  the  diagnosis  is  not  difficult  - this  is  simply
a  recurrence  of  that  disease  common  to  a  capitalistic  economy  - infla-
tion.
Doctors of  medicine  and  doctors  of  economics  alike  have  the common
fault  of  using  terms not generally  understood by  the patient.  Perhaps
we  should try  to spell out exactly  what  we mean  by the  term "inflation."
Economists  are  generally  agreed  that  inflation is that  condition  which
exists  when  consumers  are  able  and  willing  to  spend  more  money  than
there  are  goods  to  be  bought  at  existing  prices.  The  inevitable  result
is  a  rise  in  prices.
While  we  recognize  that  this  disease  is  not  normally  fatal  in  it-
self, it is  very painful.  There  have been  cases in  history where  it
went  untreated for such  long  periods that major and very serious opera-
tions  became  necessary.  Surely it  is  a  disease  which deserves the very
careful  attention of our most competent  doctors of economics,
III.  THE  CAUSES
Let  us turn then to the  third  phase  of  this  process - that of explain-
ing  the  causes  for  this  inflationary  condition  now  bothering  our  patient.
We  defined  inflation in  terms  of a lack of balance  between money  to be
spent and  goods  to  be  bought.  Simplified still  further, we  can explain
inflation in  the  terms of  the "sidewalk"  economist - through  the  inter-
action  of the  forces  of supply and demand.  What we  have  actually said
is  that  the  demand  for goods  has exceeded the  supply  of  goods  at exist-
ing prices.  Then the cause  of  inflation  must  be  found  in  a situation
of short supply and/or excessive demand.  We  shall look  at each of
these  forces  in  turn.
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can  be  placed  at  the  door-step  of  supply.  Our  industrial  production
has  increased  by  11.5  percent  during  the  past  year;  agricultural  output
in  1950  was  far  above  average  and  indications  for  this  crop  year  point
to  the  second  largest  total  production  in  our  history;  productivity  per
worker  has  increased  and  total  employment  is  approaching  an  all-time
high.  The  supply  side  of  the  picture  looks  good  - we  must  look  else-
where  for  the  source  of  our  difficulty.
Demand  is  unquestionably  the  culprit  in  this  case  Not  only  has  de-
mand  matched  our  increased  supply,  but  has  sprinted  well  beyond.  To
get  a  better  view  of  this  demand  phenomenon,  let's  trace  the  develop-
ments  since  June  1950.  As  a  background  to  this,  however,  we  should
appreciate  the  fact  that  even  before  Korea  we  were  enjoying  a  very  high
level  of  prosperity  - total  employment  was  high,  wage  levels  were  near
an  all-time  record,  personal  incomes  and  expenditures  were  at  or  near
the  highest  points  in  history.  Then  came  Korea.  Several  developments  -
some  occurring  simultaneously  - fed  the  already  smoldering  fires  of  an
inflationary  demand  spiral.  Let  us  recount  these  briefly.
A.  Anticipatory  Buying  Surge.  The  American  consuming  public,  remember-
ing  the  shortages  of  World  War  II,  immediately  plunged  into  the  market
in  a  mad  scramble  for  many  goods.  This  demand,  financed  from  current
incomes,  savings,  and  consumer  credit,  actually  threw  the  switch  on  the
inflationary  spiral.
B.  Private  Domestic  Investment.  Hand-in-hand  with  the  magnified  con-
sumer  demand  went  a  surge  of  optimism  on  the  part  of  businessmen  and  in-
vestors.  Gross  private  domestic  investment  jumped  from  an  annual  rate
of  $44  billion  in  the  first half  of  1950  to  $61.8  billion  in  the  first
half  of  1951.  This  is  money  being  spent  - an  addition  to  the  income
stream  - potential  new  demand.
C.  Expanded  Credit.  Supporting  both  the  consumer  buying  spree  of  1950
and  the  great  expansion  of  private  investment  was  a  widely  expanded
credit  base.  Between  June  1,  1950  and  December  31,  1950,  consumer
credit  outstanding  increased  by  14  percent.  While  this  has  decreased
somewhat  since  the  first  part  of  1951  it  still  is  9  percent  above  the
pre-Korea  level.  New  credit  went  beyond  the  consumer  level.  Total
loans  from  all  banks  increased  by  23  percent  between  June  1950  and  June
1951.  It  must  be  borne  in  mind  always  that  new  credit  means  new  money
to  be  added  to  the  demand  side.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  a  bank  loan  con-
tributes  far  more  to  the  inflationary  pressures  than  the  mere  quantity
loaned.  If  the  money  loaned  is  kept  in  use  it  can  add  six  or  seven
times  its  total  to  the  demand  stream.
D.  Defense  Orders.  Immediately  following  the  Korean  outbreak  our  De-
fense  Department  began  a  program  of  semi-mobilization.  The  personnel
of  the  military  establishment  was  expanded  by  more  than  100  percent.
The  production  of  military  material  became  a  matter  of  first  importance.
Financial  and  military  aid  to  our  allies  became  essential.  To  move  out
on  all  fronts  in  this  limited  mobilization  has  made  it  necessary  for'
the  Department  of Defense  to  spend  $55  billion  since  June  of  1950.  This
is  approximately  $35  billion  more  than  had  been  anticipated  before  the-
North  Korean  attack.  This  is  big  money  - money  that  surely  finds  its
way  into  the  reservior  of  demand  that  brings  relentless  pressure  against
the  existing  supply.
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total demand during the past year.  It  has simply overpowered supply.
Inflation has  been the inevitable  result.
IV. THE  DANGERS
Just as  the doctor  of medicine explains to the  interested parties
what  the  consequences of an  illness  may be  if  not  properly treated, we
as economists must  point out  to  our patient some of the  more serious
dangers  of  an uncontrolled inflation.
Perhaps  the most serious damage  done  by  inflation  is  the  dis-
tortion  of values.  Prices in  general  rise, but not all prices  rise
alike.  Nor do all  incomes  and wealth necessarily move up  the  dollar
scale together.  For example, dollars used to buy defense  bonds  in  the
early  1940's  have  now  depreciated  to  the  point  where  the  net  proceeds
of  a  bond  at  maturity  are  worth  only  about  75  percent  of  the  original
investment.  Lifetime savings  invested  in  insurance policies now  re-
turn only a fraction  of  the  purchasing power anticipated.  On  the other
hand, farm land, urban  real estate,  and  many  common stocks  have  return-
ed  rich rewards  to the  investor.  Not only have values  been thus dis-
torted, but a general feeling of uneasiness  prevails about investments
in  the future.
Inflation always penalizes  fixed-income  groups  - clerical  forces,
white-collar workers, pensioners,  annuity holders.  Their  incomes have
habitually lagged behind  the  rises  in  costs  during an inflation,  and
this  one  has been no exception.
Defense costs  - and this  is  of  prime  importance  to all of us  today -
skyrocket  even more  than other costs if  the military has to  bid  in  the
open market for scarce  resources.  A  spokesman for the Department of
Defense recently stated  that money appropriated  last fall  for defense
purposes would  now buy only 70 percent of  the quantity estimated at  the
time  the appropriation was  made.  This means  that  an ever  increasing
quantity of dollars must  be  appropriated to meet the defense require-
ments, and  this in  turn means  either more taxes  or a higher public  debt,
or  both.
An uncontrolled  inflation could  conceivably, carried to  its  ultimate
conclusion,  result  in  a  complete  breakdown in  our monetary system.  If
prices  should continue to rise,  but at an accelerated  rate,  holders  of
money would try to get  "out of money and  into goods."  This could devel-
op  into a panic with a resultant  flight  of capital  from our country  in-
to  foreign holdings.  Economic chaos  would surely result.  Let us  be
very clear on this  point - there is  absolutely no evidence available to-
day to  indicate  that such a condition  is  developing or will develop in
the United States.  On the contrary, such a  development  is  highly un-
likely.  Nevertheless,  this  is  a possibility that we must not  ignore
when enumerating the dangers  of an  unbridled  inflation.
V.  THE  ALTERNATIVE  PRESCRIPTIONS
We  can now focus  our attention on that all-important last  step - the
spelling out of alternative  prescriptions.  Again we  find  ourselves in
much the  same position  as  the doctor of medicine.  We can suggest  the
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each,  yet  we  have  no  way  of  forcing  our  patient  to  follow  our  recommenda-
tions.  There  appear  to  be  three  approaches  to  treating  this  disease  and
each  has  its  advocates.  We  shall  list  them  and  mention  some  of  the
strong  and  weak  points  associated  with  each.
A.  Do  Nothing.  There  are  some  who  contend  that  the  only  proper  way  to handle
this  disease  is  to  let  it  alone.  This  group  contends  that  our  system  is
automatic  in  its  functioning  and  that  higher  prices  will  reflect  the
message  to  the  producer  to  produce  more.  By  following  this  procedure  we
would  eliminate  all  administrative  costs  and  the  inconvenience  of  other
schemes  and  would  insure  the  continued  operation  of  a  free  market.
Opponents  of  this  proposal  argue  that  there  are  two  major  defects  in
such  a  scheme.  In  the  first  place,  if  prices  were  permitted  to  move
freely  through  the  inflationary  cycle,  many  inequities  would  be  created
between  different  income  groups.  The  second  argument  against  this  sug-
gestion  is  that  if  prices  continue  to  move  upward  and  production  con-
tinues  to  respond,  a  point  of  full  employment  of  all  resources  is  soon
reached.  Beyond  this  point  higher  prices  serve  only  to  add  to  "paper"
profits  and  contribute  to  a  wage-price  battle.
B.  Indirect  Controls.  Much  has  been written  and  spoken  by  economists
.who  favor  attacking  inflation  through  this  scheme  of  indirect  controls.
Specifically,  the  steps  usually  recommended  are:
1.  Increase  federal  taxes,  principally  through  use  of  progressive  in-
come  taxes.
2.  Curtail  and  control  the  supply  of  money.
3.  Use  of  consumer  credit  controls.
4.  Reduce  the  volume  of  government  loans  and  guarantee  of  loans.
5. Reduce  public  works  activities  to a  minimum.
Many  advantages  are.claimed  for  this  system.  In  the  first  place,  it
is  designed  to  attack  the  disease  at  its  source  - i.e.,  reduce  the
pressure  on  the  demand  side  by  siphoning  away  available  purchasing  pow-
er.  This  is  in contrast  to  other  proposals  which  attack  the  symptoms
and  not  the  disease.  Secondly,  this  plan  would  not  interfere  with  the
normal  automatic  operations  of  the  market.  Lastly,  such  a  scheme  would
be  relatively  inexpensive  from  the  standpoint  of  administrative  costs
and  would  be  more  palatable  to  the  public  than  one  involving  more  di-
rect intervention  on  the  part  of  the  government.
Critics  of  this  suggestion  for  the  most  part  admire  the  esthetic
beauty  of  the  program  but  challenge  its  ability  to  move  effectively  and
rapidly  in controlling  inflation.  Moreover,  a  real  danger  is  inherent  in
this  proposal  - that  the  controls  might  be  applied  so  vigorously  that  a
"depression  psychology"  would  overtake  the  economy  and  unemployment
would  follow.  Such  a  psychology,  once  underway,  is  admittedly  difficult
to  reverse.  One  further  criticism  of  this  plan  is  that  a  system  of
equitable  and  administratively  feasible  taxation  is  indeed  difficult  to
devise,  to  say  nothing  of  the  political  acceptability  of  such  a  plan.
C.  A Combination  of  Direct  and  Indirect  Controls.  This  prescription
would  call  for  the  moderate  application  of  a  system  of  indirect  controls,
but  for  immediate  results  would  supplement  this  with  a  system  of  direct
price  and  wage  controls  and  government  allocation  of  scarce  materials.
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mediate  results  while  waiting  for  the  slower  indirect  control  program  to
become  effective.  It  is  further  contended  that  the  price  ceilings  serve
to  equalize  the  sacrifices  necessitated  by  the  defense  program  in  that
prices  of  scarce  commodities  are  held  within  the  reach  of  the  low  income
groups.  Otherwise,  the  wealthy  would  be  able  to  outbid  the  poor  and
gross  inequities  would  result.  One  further  advantage  claimed  for  this
approach  is  that  it  makes  it  possible  for  the  defense  establishment  to
procure  necessary  goods  at  reasonable  prices.
Opposition  to  any  system.of  direct  controls  has  been  vigorous  from
many economists.  It  is  held  by  these  dissenters  that  (1)  we  are  not  in
full  war  and  therefore  the patriotic motive necessary  to permit controls
to operate  is  almost  wholly lacking;  (2)  if  this  "semi-hot" war  should
last for  10 years  or  longer  - as  is  often predicted  - the  American public
would rebel  at the thought  of a long period  of  "regimentation";  (3)  the
function  of our price  system,  i.e.,  to guide  production and  ration goods
would be rendered  largely ineffective  through the establishment of
arbitrary  price and wage ceilings;  and  (4)  such a  direct control plan
does not attack the true source of the  trouble  at  all,  but rather directs
its attention toward  the  symptoms.  It  would,  at best,  but suppress an
inflation.
These  are  the three major alternative prescriptions which are avail-
able for  our patient  to follow.  The decision  as to which is  chosen must
be made  by the patient  through whatever  reasoning process  there is  in
existence.
We must concern ourselves  about these processes of  reasoning in  this
economy  of  the United States.  Decisions  as  to which  route we will  fol-
low  in  combating  this  No.  1 domestic  enemy must be made by an enlight-
ened public.  Legislation enacted by our Congress should  and must re-
flect  the  will  of the  people if  it  is to  be  lasting  and  effective.  A
prerequisite to such  sound  and  lasting  legislation is,  therefore, a bet-
ter  understanding on  the part  of  the citizens of  the  fundamental  issues
involved.
It  is  toward this  goal that  I  have  directed  my  remarks.
BACKGROUND  MATERIAL  FOR  PUBLIC  POLICY  EDUCATION
ON  THE  PROBLEM  OF  INFLATION
Prepared  by  Dale  E.  Hathaway
This  discussion  attempts  to  cover  briefly  some  of  the  background
material  that  should  be  helpful  to  those  who  wish  to  do  public  policy
education  on  the  subject  of  inflation.  It  discusses:
1.  What  is  inflation?
2.  What  causes  it?
3.  What  are  the effects  of  inflation?
4.  When  does  inflation  become  dangerous?
5.  Possible  alternative  methods  of  controlling
inflation.
6.  The  present  situation.
7.  The  meaning  of  mobilization.
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